Presentation: Capturing 0days with PERFectly Placed Hardware Traps
The security industry has gone to great lengths to make exploitation more difficult. Yet we continue to see weaponized exploits used in malware campaigns and targeted attacks capable of bypassing OS and vendor exploit mitigation strategies. Many of these newly deployed mitigations target code-reuse attacks like return-oriented-programming. Unfortunately, the reality is that once attackers have control over code execution it's only a matter of time before they can circumvent these defenses, as the recent rise of EMET bypasses illustrates. We propose a new strategy to raise the bar significantly. Our approach blocks exploits before they gain execution, preventing the opportunity to bypass mitigations.
This presentation was given at Black Hat 2016 and introduces a new cross-platform, hardware-assisted Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) approach to mitigate control-flow hijack attacks on the Intel architecture. Prior research has demonstrated the effectiveness of leveraging processor-provided features such as the Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) in order to trap various events for detecting ROP behaviors. We extend and generalize this approach by fine-tuning low-level processor features that enable us to insert a CFI policy to detect and prevent abnormal branches in real-time. Our promising results have shown this approach capable of protecting COTS binaries from control-flow hijack attempts stemming from use-after-free and memory corruption vulnerabilities with acceptable overhead on modern Windows and Linux systems.